what factors contributed to the worlds overall population in the last 150 years
When demographers attempt to forecast changes in the size of a population, they typically focus on four chief factors: fertility rates, bloodshed rates (life expectancy), the initial age profile of the population (whether information technology is relatively sometime or relatively young to begin with) and migration. In the instance of religious groups, a fifth factor is switching – how many people cull to enter and leave each group, including how many go unaffiliated with any religion.
This affiliate presents an overview of each of these 5 main drivers of population change. It highlights important trends, discusses key assumptions about the futurity and acknowledges weak spots in the demographic information currently available on some countries and religious groups.
In some cases, this chapter likewise shows how different the projections would be if item factors, such as migration, were not taken into account. These hypothetical scenarios are intended to requite readers a sense of how much bear upon various factors have on the projections.
Fertility
Over the concluding one-half century, the global fertility charge per unit has fallen sharply.xiv In the 1950 to 1955 period, the average woman was expected to have about v children over the course of her lifetime. By 2010-2015, the global average was about 2.5 children per woman.fifteen According to the Un Population Segmentation, worldwide fertility rates are expected to keep to drop in the decades to come, gradually moving toward two.i children per woman, which is traditionally viewed as the "replacement level" needed to maintain a stable population in countries with low mortality rates among the young.sixteen
Equally a result of failing fertility rates, global population growth is slowing. Over the four decades from 1970 to 2010, the number of people on Earth grew nearly 90%. From 2010 to 2050, the world's population is expected to ascension 35%, from roughly seven billion to more than nine billion.
Among the globe's major religious groups, Muslims have the highest Total Fertility Rate every bit of 2010-2015, a global average of 3.ane children per adult female. This is i of the main reasons why the Muslim population is expected to grow not only in accented numbers but as well in relative terms – as a percentage of all the people in the world – in the decades to come.
Christians (2.7 children per woman) are the only other major religious group whose Total Fertility Charge per unit, on a worldwide basis, exceeds the boilerplate for all women (2.5), during the present five-year flow (2010-2015).
Globally, fertility amongst Hindus (2.4 children per woman) and Jews (2.three) is above the replacement level (2.1 children). Fertility rates amidst all the other groups – followers of folk religions (i.8), other religions as a whole (one.7), the religiously unaffiliated (1.7) and Buddhists (ane.6) – are below the replacement level, pregnant the groups are non bearing enough children to maintain their current populations, all else remaining equal.
1 of the assumptions backside the U.N.'s global population forecasts, also equally the Pew Inquiry projections, is that over time fertility rates generally converge toward the replacement level.17 If they start above the replacement level, they tend to decline. If they start below the replacement level, they tend to rising – although they may alter slowly and may not really reach the replacement level in the coming decades.
Thus, the religious groups with fertility rates above replacement level in 2010 – Muslims, Christians, Hindus and Jews – are expected to experience a pass up in their fertility rates by 2050. Fertility rates for Muslims and Hindus are projected to turn down nigh sharply – more than 20% – from 3.1 to ii.3 children per Muslim woman and from 2.4 to ane.viii children per Hindu woman. Among Christians, the fertility charge per unit is projected to turn down from 2.7 children to 2.3. The worldwide fertility charge per unit amongst Jews also is expected to drop, albeit only slightly, from two.iii in 2010 to two.i in 2050.
At the same time, fertility rates amid the four religious groups that are beneath two.1 children per woman every bit of 2010 – followers of folk religions, other religions, Buddhists and the unaffiliated – are expected to rise somewhat over the next four decades, moving closer to the replacement level.18
Country-Level Differences
Since some major religious groups are concentrated in a pocket-sized number of countries, fertility patterns in a few countries can have a big influence on a group's global fertility charge per unit. For example, Hindus are expected to experience a decline in their Total Fertility Rate over the adjacent 4 decades in part because India's overall fertility rate has been dropping – from 5.nine children per adult female in 1950 to 2.5 in 2010 – and is expected to fall to one.nine by 2050. (Roughly 94% of the world's Hindus live in India.)
Similarly, since roughly viii-in-x of the world'south Jews live in either the United States or Israel, Jewish fertility rates are heavily influenced by patterns in those two countries. While State of israel's overall fertility rate is expected to decrease – from 2.ix in 2010 to 2.ii in 2050 – U.S. fertility rates are expected to stay relatively stable (around 2.ane) over the same menstruation. The combined affect is a slight decrease in Jewish fertility, globally.
China is home to at least half of all Buddhists, adherents of folk religions and religiously unaffiliated people in the world. Consequently, Communist china'due south fertility patterns take a substantial affect on expected fertility rates for these groups. The United Nations Population Division anticipates that China's Total Fertility Rate will decrease from 1.6 children per adult female in 2010 to ane.5 in 2020, and and then begin rising, reaching ane.8 by 2050. Similarly, Buddhists, adherents of folk religions and religiously unaffiliated people are expected to experience a similar initial reject or plateau in their fertility rates, followed by a subsequent increase, as shown in this chart higher up.
Future fertility rates for each land in this report are based on forecasts published past the United Nations Population Division.19 While following the U.Northward.'s overall projections at the country level, notwithstanding, researchers at the Pew Research Eye and the International Establish for Applied Systems Analysis analyzed more than 200 censuses and surveys to summate fertility rates specific to major religious groups within 135 countries and territories, which constitute 93% of the world'south 2010 population.twenty An additional 3% of the world's population live in 29 countries in which the overwhelming majority (over 95%) of people within the country vest to just one major religious group. In the remaining countries and territories, which include 4% of the globe's population, reliable data on fertility rates for religious groups were non available.21 In both of these latter categories, each religious group was assigned the country's overall fertility rate.
Projections of future fertility rates within each country assume that differences in fertility levels between religious groups will slowly disappear (reaching convergence after 100 years – i.e., in the year 2110) as differences in their levels of instruction and access to contraceptives gradually attenuate.
Regional Differences in Fertility
Fertility patterns may vary betwixt countries and larger geographic regions for a host of reasons, including cultural norms, levels of economic development, education systems and government policies that encourage or discourage family planning. Fertility rates also may be influenced by infant mortality rates, women's participation in the labor marketplace, income levels and social status, amongst other factors.
Of the six geographic regions analyzed in this study, only two have a Total Fertility Rate that is higher than the global average of 2.5 children per woman: sub-Saharan Africa (4.8) and the Center East and Due north Africa (iii.0). The Latin America-Caribbean region has the tertiary-highest fertility rate (2.ii), followed by the Asia-Pacific region (2.one) and North America (ii.0). Europe is the just region with a fertility charge per unit that is well below replacement level (1.half dozen).
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East-North Africa region, the two areas where fertility rates exceed the global average in the current flow (2010-2015), are expected to have the highest rates of population growth in the coming decades. These are the but regions where population growth is expected to outpace global population growth from 2010 to 2050.
Within a unmarried religious group, fertility rates can vary enormously depending on where people live. For example, Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa have a fertility rate of 5.half-dozen children per woman, on average, while Muslims in Europe have an boilerplate of ii.i children per adult female. Similarly, religiously unaffiliated people in sub-Saharan Africa accept more than four children per woman, on average, while the fertility rate amid Europe'due south unaffiliated population – 1.4 children per woman – is well beneath replacement level.
In nigh regions where reliable fertility data are available for religious groups, Muslims have more than children per woman than the regional average. Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa have the highest Total Fertility Rate (5.half dozen) of whatsoever major religious group in any large region. Across the Asia-Pacific region, North America and Europe, fertility rates among Muslims too are higher than among Christians and the unaffiliated. In the Middle Eastward and North Africa, Muslims brand up more than than 90% of the population and are largely responsible for the region'south relatively high fertility charge per unit (3.0).22
Because some religious groups are heavily full-bodied in a few regions and are rare in other places, separate fertility rates cannot exist reliably calculated for all groups in all regions. Reliable data on fertility levels are unavailable, for example, among the relatively small number of Jews in sub-Saharan Africa, Muslims in Latin America and the Caribbean and religiously unaffiliated people in the Middle Due east and North Africa.
In the two regions where overall population growth is expected to be fastest in the coming decades – sub-Saharan Africa and the Centre East-North Africa region – Christian fertility rates are lower than the regional averages (4.five children per woman amidst Christians compared with 4.eight overall in sub-Saharan Africa, and 2.5 among Christians compared with 3.0 overall in the Middle East and N Africa). On the other hand, in the iv regions where overall population growth is expected to exist slower, Christian fertility rates equal or exceed the regional averages. In North America, for example, Christians have a higher fertility rate (two.i) than the regional population every bit a whole (two.0).
In virtually every region where information are available, the unaffiliated take a fertility charge per unit that is lower than the regional average. In sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, North America and Europe, fertility amid religiously unaffiliated people is lower than the regional averages and lower than the rates among Christians and Muslims. (Run into chart in a higher place.) The one exception is Latin America and the Caribbean, where the unaffiliated take slightly higher fertility (ii.3 children per woman) than the regional average (2.2).
Hypothetical Scenarios: Seeing How Much Deviation Fertility Makes
As previously noted, the projections in this report take into account differences in fertility rates amid major religious groups within 135 countries and territories. Over fourth dimension, these differences tin can be highly consequential. For example, Nigeria is estimated at present to take roughly equal numbers of Christians and Muslims, but Nigerian Muslims have a significantly higher Total Fertility Rate (vi.five children per adult female) than Nigerian Christians (iv.5). As a effect, Muslims are expected to make upwards 59% of Nigeria's population by 2050, while the Christian share is projected to drib to 39%.
1 way to come across the bear upon of fertility differences on population projections is to use an alternative set of assumptions, such as assigning all religious groups within each country the same charge per unit.
In Nigeria, for example, this hypothetical scenario would mean that both Christians and Muslims would be assigned – for the sake of illustration – the land's average fertility charge per unit (5.4 children per adult female). If this were the case, in this alternating projection model, Nigeria'south total population in 2050 would be larger than it is today (this is as well true in the main projection model), but the country's religious composition would not modify much over the coming decades, ending with nearly equal shares of Christians (48%) and Muslims (50%) in 2050.23 Comparison the results of the ii scenarios, it is clear that Muslims' higher fertility rates are gradually reshaping the country's religious composition.
By contrast, at the global level, the alternative project scenario would yield little change in the size of major religions. If i were to artificially presume that within each country, all religious groups shared the same fertility charge per unit, Muslims would still be the fastest-growing major religious group worldwide, and the religious limerick of the globe in 2050 would expect very like to how it appears in the master project scenario. There would be only a slight uptick in the Christian share of the world'southward population (32% instead of 31%) and a corresponding decrease in the Muslim share (29% instead of 30%).
The outcomes of the ii projection scenarios are like considering the future growth of religious groups is driven largely past differences in the geographic regions and individual countries in which the groups are concentrated. Since people's fertility choices have much to do with their social and economic environments, differences in fertility betwixt countries are oft much greater than differences in fertility among religious groups within a single country. For example, equally noted to a higher place, the Christian fertility rate in Nigeria is 4.5 children per adult female, while the Muslim fertility rate in Nigeria is 6.v. In Australia, the fertility rates for Christians and Muslims are 2.0 and 3.0, respectively. In both places, the fertility rate amongst Muslims is higher than among Christians. Simply the differences inside each country are smaller than the differences between the two countries, with the boilerplate woman in Nigeria bearing about 3.5 more children than her counterpart in Australia.
Life Expectancy
Life expectancy at birth – an estimate of the expected life span of an average newborn kid – has been ascent around the earth. According to the Un, global life expectancy at nascency increased from 48 years in the 1950 to 1955 period to 69 years in 2010-2015, and it is expected to continue to rise over the side by side four decades.24
People in many (though not all) countries are living longer due to increased access to healthcare, improvements in diet and hygiene, effective responses to infectious disease, and many other factors.
These developments in healthcare and living weather, yet, have non occurred uniformly around the world. Every bit a issue, life expectancy varies across the six regions in this study. At present, North America has the highest average life expectancy (79 years), followed closely by Europe (77) and Latin America and the Caribbean (75). Average life expectancies in the Center East and North Africa (72) and the Asia-Pacific region (seventy) are slightly above the global average (69). Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region where average life expectancy (55 years) is below the global average.
By 2050, life expectancy at nascency is projected to boilerplate 76 years around the world, an increase of about seven years from the current 5-year flow (2010-2015). All six geographic regions are expected to run across a ascent in their populations' life expectancy over the coming decades. But regions and individual countries that have relatively high life expectancies in 2010-2015 are expected to make merely minor gains compared with regions and private countries where life expectancy, at present, is much lower. For example, North America is expected to see a five-twelvemonth gain in life expectancy by 2050 – from 79 to 84 years. Sub-Saharan Africa, meanwhile, is projected to experience an increment in average life expectancy of xiii years, from 55 to 68 years.
Life expectancy is a significant factor in estimating the size of the world's populations over time. Groups with college life expectancies will, on boilerplate, alive longer and (all else remaining equal) have larger populations. A higher share of young people who are alive today in Europe and North America are likely to exist alive in 2050 compared with those residing in sub-Saharan Africa and the Asia-Pacific region.
At the same fourth dimension, the greater-than-boilerplate increase in life expectancy that is projected in sub-Saharan Africa is ane of the reasons its population is expanding so quickly and boosting the global size of the region's ii biggest religious groups, Muslims and Christians.
Worldwide, picayune information is available on differences in life expectancy amid religious groups within private countries. In the absenteeism of better information, the projections in this report assume that people in all religious groups have the average life expectancy of the state in which they live. For example, both Christians and Muslims in Nigeria are assigned the country's average life expectancy for 2010-2015 (53 years), while both Christians and Muslims in the United kingdom are assigned the U.K.'south average life expectancy for 2010-2015, which is lxxx years.
Nevertheless, differences in life expectancy play an important role in the population growth projections. This is because the globe'southward major religious groups are concentrated in different countries, and some countries take much higher life expectancies than others.
For example, because of the countries in which Jews are full-bodied, the global life expectancy at birth for Jews in the present five-twelvemonth flow (2010-2015) is estimated to be lxxx years, the highest of whatsoever of the religious groups in this report. Other groups that are concentrated in countries where life expectancy at birth currently exceeds the global average (69 years) are the religiously unaffiliated (75 years), Buddhists (74 years), members of folk religions (73 years), followers of other religions (71 years) and Christians (71 years). By contrast, both Muslims (67 years) and Hindus (66 years) are concentrated in countries with relatively low life expectancy at nativity.
In the 2050-2055 period, Jews still are projected to take the highest life expectancy of all the major religious groups, a global average of 85 years, five years longer than at present. But the greatest gains in longevity over the next four decades are expected amid Hindus, whose global average life expectancy is projected to rise from 66 years in 2010-2015 to 75 years in 2050-2055.
Age Structure
In the decades ahead, the world'southward population volition increment every bit people live longer. From 1950 until about 1980, the median age of the earth'southward population remained in the low 20s. By 2010, nonetheless, the median age of the population was 28 years. And by 2050, the global median historic period is expected to be 37, as failing fertility rates lead to relative stability in the number of immature children and as the elderly population soars. The United Nations estimates that the number of people ages 100 and older will rise from about 150,000 in the yr 2000 to more than iii million in 2050.
A simple fashion to look at the historic period structure of the world'southward population is to divide anybody into three age groups – children younger than 15, teens and adults between ages xv and 59 and adults ages sixty and older. As of 2010, the largest grouping was the middle category (62%), and there were many more children (27%) than older adults (eleven%). Only equally the global population ages, this distribution will shift, particularly among the youngest and oldest cohorts. Past 2050, according to U.N. projections, the share of people ages 60 and older (22%) will exceed the share under age fifteen (20%).The youthfulness of a population is an important factor in future growth. All else existence equal, a population that begins with a relatively large percentage of people who are in – or soon will enter – their prime childbearing years will grow faster than a population that begins with many people who are beyond their prime reproductive years. Moreover, growth propelled by a youthful population tends to carry into the next generation, as the younger cohort's children reach maturity and brainstorm to accept babies of their own, creating a kind of demographic momentum.
Amidst the world'southward major religious groups, Muslims had the highest concentration of children as of 2010 (34% of Muslims worldwide were under the age of 15), while Jews had the highest concentration of older adults (20% of Jews worldwide were 60 or older in 2010).
Globally, fewer than one-in-5 religiously unaffiliated people (xix%) were under the historic period of fifteen, the smallest share of children in any of the major religious groups in 2010. This reflects the geographic concentration of the unaffiliated in countries such equally China and Japan, which take relatively onetime populations with low fertility rates.
For similar reasons, Buddhists also are an older population, with just 20% nether age xv. Past contrast, more a quarter of Christians worldwide and three-in-x Hindus were in the youngest historic period group as of 2010. This reflects the loftier fertility rates in recent decades amidst Christians in sub-Saharan Africa and Hindus in Republic of india.
For the purposes of projecting future growth, the number of women in their early reproductive years also is a key cistron. As of 2010, 13% of the earth'due south population consisted of females between the ages of 15 and 29. Muslims were the merely major religious grouping with a college share of women in this category (xiv%) than the global average, yet another reason the Muslim population is poised for rapid growth in the coming decades. The religiously unaffiliated (11%) and Jews (10%) had the lowest shares of women ages xv-29 in their populations, as of 2010.
Religious Switching
In many countries, it is fairly mutual for adults to switch from identifying with the religion in which they grew up to identifying with another religion or with no religion.25 But simply in recent decades have cantankerous-national surveys begun to measure individual changes in religious identity.26 The broadest assay of religious switching published in recent years examined just forty countries, primarily in Europe, using data nerveless between 1991 and 2001.27
The projections in this report go further, showing what the future religious landscape may look like if switching continues at the same rates recently observed in 70 countries, which are spread throughout the world's major regions.28 Data on these switching patterns come from surveys carried out between 2008 and 2013 past the Pew Research Center and other organizations, including studies carried out under the auspices of the International Social Survey Plan. This drove of information provides the most comprehensive flick available to date of global patterns of switching among major religious groups, including from having been raised in a religion to being religiously unaffiliated every bit an developed.29
Levels of switching are dissimilar for men and women. But at the global level, cyberspace movement due to the religious switching of men and women follows like patterns. The nautical chart below shows the projected total amount of movement into and out of major religious groups betwixt 2010 and 2050 for countries with data on switching.
The largest net movement is expected to exist out of Christianity (66 million people), including the net departure of twice equally many men (44 million) every bit women (22 meg). Similarly, internet gains among the unaffiliated (61 million) are projected to be more twice every bit large for men (43 million) as for women (xix million). Muslims and followers of folk religions and other religions are expected to experience modest gains due to religious switching. Jews and Buddhists are expected to experience modest cyberspace losses through religious switching.
Regional Patterns
At the regional level, some patterns stand out. The largest projected net gains from switching between 2010 and 2050 are into the ranks of the unaffiliated, particularly in North America (26 million), Europe (24 1000000), Latin America (6 million) and the Asia-Pacific region (4 one thousand thousand). Simply in sub-Saharan Africa, the greatest net gains are expected for Muslims (3 million).
The largest internet losses are expected among Christian populations, notably in Due north America (28 million), Europe (24 million), Latin America and the Caribbean area (nine million) and sub-Saharan Africa (3 million). In the Asia-Pacific region, Christians are expected to have a cyberspace loss, due to religious switching, of more than than 2 meg adherents.
Alternative Scenarios: Seeing How Much Difference Switching Makes
Religious switching may take a large impact on the religious limerick of private countries. But over the 40-year horizon of these projections, it is expected to have only a modest result on the global size of most religious groups.
The global impact of religious switching can be seen past comparing the chief project scenario used in this study, which models switching in 70 countries, with two hypothetical scenarios – i in which switching is modeled in a total of a 155 countries, and 1 that assumes no switching will occur anywhere.
In the chief projection model used throughout this report, the 70 countries with documented switching data contain 42% of the world'south population, equally of 2010. In the second scenario considered here, switching is projected in an additional 85 countries by using some of the initial 70 countries as proxies for switching patterns in similar, frequently neighboring, nations.30 For example, although no direct information on switching is bachelor for Canada, i might assume that Canada is similar to the United states of america and therefore utilize the same rates of switching observed in the U.Southward. to Canada's population. Since the 85 additional countries business relationship for about 10% of the globe'southward population, the second scenario models switching among a little more than half the people on Earth.
The tertiary scenario assumes that no religious switching volition take place from 2010 to 2050, meaning that every adult will remain in the group in which he or she was raised. All those raised as Christians will stay Christian, all those raised without a religion volition stay unaffiliated, and so on. Just this hypothetical "no switching" scenario, like the other two scenarios, takes into account all the other demographic drivers affecting the future size of religious groups: fertility rates, bloodshed rates, current age profiles and migration patterns.
The biggest differences in the effect of these three scenarios are the size of the Christian and unaffiliated populations in 2050. The Christian share of the globe's population is greatest in the "no switching" scenario (32.three%), followed by the main scenario that models switching in 70 countries (31.four%). It is slightly lower (31.three%) in the scenario that models switching in 155 countries.
The unaffiliated share of the globe's population is lowest in 2050 (12.3%) in the scenario with no switching. When switching is modeled in 70 countries – the main scenario – 13.2% of the world's population is projected to have no religious affiliation in 2050. When switching is modeled for an additional 85 countries using proxy data, the projections show 13.iv% of the global population as religiously unaffiliated in 2050.
Comparison the outcomes of these 3 scenarios suggests that religious switching – at least at recently observed levels, in the limited number of countries for which data on switching are bachelor – volition take a relatively small impact on the projected size of major religious groups in 2050.
The biggest unknown factor, however, is China, the earth's most populous country. Considering of a lack of reliable data on religious switching in China, none of the scenarios models religious switching amidst its 1.3 billion people. If there is considerable switching in Communist china in the coming decades, information technology could lower the percentage of the world'south population that is unaffiliated and heave the numbers of Christians, Buddhists and peradventure other groups. (Encounter sidebar on China at the cease of this affiliate.)
Migration
International migration has no immediate impact on the global size of religious groups. Merely, over time, migration tin can significantly change the religious makeup of individual countries and fifty-fifty entire regions. Europe, for example, has experienced an inflow of Muslims from Northward Africa, S Asia and Turkey over the past decade. And some of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, accept had substantial clearing of non-Muslims from Asia and beyond.31
Estimating future migration is challenging because the movement of people across borders is dependent on government policies and international events that can change quickly. And because many migrants follow economic opportunities, migration patterns also are dependent on changing economic weather condition.
Withal, information technology is possible to use information on past migration as a reasonable guess for the future, just as past fertility and religious switching patterns are used in this report to model future fertility and switching.
The Pew Inquiry Center, in collaboration with researchers at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, has developed an innovative technique to approximate recent migration patterns and their religious breakdown. First, contempo changes in the origins and destinations of migrants worldwide are estimated using demography and survey data about the migrant population living in each land. Changes in this migrant "stock" data over the 2005 to 2010 catamenia are used to estimate migrant "flows," the number of people who moved betwixt countries during this flow, taking into account the slowing of migration in many parts of the globe due to an economic downturn.32 Second, religious breakdowns of migrants based on data from the Pew Research Eye's Global Religion and Migration Database are practical to the origins and destinations of migrants. Finally, the religious breakdown of migrant flows is used to calculate migration rates into and out of most countries by religion, by sexual practice and by five-yr age groups. (For more detail on how futurity migration was projected, run into the Methodology.)
Initial Effects of Migration, 2010-2015
Between 2010 and 2015, approximately nineteen million people are expected to move across international borders. About of them are either Christians or Muslims, the globe's two largest religious groups. Christian migrants who are projected to number nearly 9 one thousand thousand, or 46% of all international migrants betwixt 2010 and 2015 are expected to come primarily from Latin America and the Caribbean area and to move primarily to the Usa. Muslim migrants, numbering about 6 1000000 in total, are expected to come largely from the Asia-Pacific and Middle East-North Africa regions, migrating within those aforementioned regions as well as to Europe and N America.
Virtually 3 million migrants, or about fourteen% of the expected total between 2010 and 2015, are estimated to be Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, adherents of folk religions or members of other religious groups. About ii one thousand thousand migrants (9%) are expected to have no religious affiliation.
Equally a consequence of these movements from one region to another, the Asia-Pacific region is projected to feel a net loss of approximately two million Muslims and 500,000 Hindus betwixt 2010 and 2015. The Latin America-Caribbean region is likely to see a internet loss of 3 one thousand thousand Christians from migration. And sub-Saharan Africa is projected to take a internet loss of about 500,000 Christians and Muslims, combined.
However, the birth rates in these regions are relatively high, and their current populations are relatively immature. Consequently, their full populations are projected to grow despite emigration, and the outflows are non likely to significantly alter their religious makeup.
By contrast, net inflows of migrants are expected to have a substantial touch on the religious makeup of many countries in Europe, North America and the Middle Due east-North Africa region. For example, a net inflow of 1 million Muslims is projected to occur in Europe betwixt 2010 and 2015. Smaller numerical gains from migration also are projected in Europe for both Buddhists and Hindus.
Religious minorities in North America also are expected to experience internet gains from migration between 2010 and 2015, including Muslims (nigh 400,000), Hindus (near 200,000) and Buddhists (about 200,000). These religious groups are expected to come from all over the world, but primarily from Asia and the Pacific.
The Middle East-Due north Africa region is probable to see a internet arrival of Hindus and Christians through migration, primarily to the oil-rich Gulf states. Hindus are expected to come principally from Bharat and Nepal, while Christians are projected to come from the Philippines, other countries in Asia and the Pacific and Europe.
Seeing How Much Difference Migration Makes in the 2010-2050 Projections
To see how much impact migration has on the projections, researchers compared the chief project scenario used in this report with an alternative scenario in which no international migration occurs after 2010.
The main projections in this study point that the share of Muslims in Europe'due south population will most double between 2010 and 2050, from about 5.ix% to ten.ii%. A diversity of factors, including higher birth rates and a bulging youth population among Muslims in Europe, underlie this expected increase. But clearing as well plays a function. The projected share of Muslims in Europe in 2050 is nearly two per centum points higher than in the alternative scenario with no new migration. Indeed, most half (53%) of the projected growth of Europe's Muslim population can be attributed to new migration.
In certain countries, the impact is even greater. Sweden's population, for case, was iv.6% Muslim as of 2010; factoring in migration, that share is expected to more double, to 12.4%, past 2050. In an alternative scenario involving no additional immigration to Sweden afterwards 2010, the Muslim share of the population still would increment past 2050, but simply to half dozen.8%. In improver to Sweden, the European countries in which migration is projected to make the biggest impact on the Muslim population – a difference of at least three percentage points – are Kingdom of norway, Kingdom of spain and the United Kingdom.
In North America, minority religious groups (including Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, other religions and the unaffiliated) besides are projected to grow, partly due to immigration. For case, Muslims are projected to make up 2.4% of North America's population in 2050 when factoring in migration, but only 1.4% with no new migration. Similarly, the ranks of the religiously unaffiliated in Due north America are forecast to be 1.5 per centum points higher in a project scenario that includes migration than in an alternative scenario that assumes zero migration from 2010 to 2050.
A few countries in the Asia-Pacific region are probable to feel religious change due to clearing. For example, Australia and New Zealand are projected to have slight increases in their non-Christian populations, as Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus continue moving to these ii countries. Muslim and Christian populations are forecast to abound in economic hubs such every bit Hong Kong and Japan as immigrants belonging to these religious groups motility from various countries in East Asia, including Indonesia and the Philippines. Meanwhile, the Hindu and Muslim shares of Singapore'south population are anticipated to grow significantly in the years ahead, mostly due to migration from Bharat and Malaysia.
The Centre E-N Africa region also is expected to experience substantial religious modify when immigration is factored into the projections, more often than not due to anticipated migration to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The shares of Hindus and Buddhists are both projected to rise in these majority-Muslim countries; in fact, about ninety% of Buddhist and Hindu growth in the region can be attributed to migration. Although migration is expected to boost the religious diversity of GCC countries, all the Gulf states are projected to retain Muslim majorities in 2050.
Religious change also can occur every bit a result of emigration, the movement of people out of a country or region. The departure of Christians from the Middle Eastward-North Africa region, for example, lowers the projected share of Christians in places such as Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and Syria.
But across the Middle Due east and North Africa as a whole, the emigration of Christians is expected to exist start by an influx of Christian immigrants in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Indeed, the net number of Christians entering GCC countries is expected to be about iii times as big (i.v meg) as the net number of Christians leaving countries with celebrated Christian populations in the Middle East-Due north Africa region (nigh 500,000).
Emigration of smaller religious groups from some regions is expected to accept a noticeable result. For example, most of the projected decline in the number of Jews in Europe (from 1.4 1000000 in 2010 to 1.two meg in 2050) and sub-Saharan Africa (from 100,000 in 2010 to 70,000 in 2050) tin can be attributed to Jewish emigration from these regions, mainly to Israel. And nigh of the expected decline of Hindus in Latin America and the Caribbean (from 660,000 in 2010 to 640,000 in 2050) is due to Hindu emigration out of the region, mainly to North America.
The Potential Impact of Religious Switching in China
With a population currently estimated at more than than 1.iii billion, China could make a large difference in the global religious landscape during the coming decades. People's republic of china now officially recognizes Buddhism, Islam, Taoism, as well every bit Protestants associated with the Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement and Catholics who are office of the Catholic Patriotic Association.33 Adherents of other religions, including Christians who worship in unregistered churches, may exist reluctant to reveal their religious identity to officials or strangers. Measuring religious affiliation in Cathay relies on imperfect surveys and other sources of data, including reports past official religious bodies, ethnic proxies (for Muslims), and estimates by religious groups operating in networks that are not approved by the Chinese government. Surveys that do exist, for instance, seem to underreport unregistered groups and Chinese folk religions in particular. Therefore, non only are current estimates only rough estimates, but reliable information on recent trends are unobtainable. Furthermore, in the past decade hundreds of millions of Chinese have moved from the countryside – where unregistered practice was reported by observers to be higher – to cities where religious networks may non have been transferred or replaced.34
There are no sources adequate to measure patterns of religious switching across Red china. This sidebar briefly reviews some of the challenges of measuring religion in Cathay and provides an case of how religious switching in China could alter the global projections in this report.
While it is articulate that religious affiliation and do have risen dramatically in China since the cease of the Cultural Revolution, data on contempo patterns of religious switching are practically nonexistent35. Anecdotally, some newspaper articles and reports from religious groups have attempted to describe changes underway in People's republic of china, but it is unclear how accurately these accounts reflect alter underway at the country level.36 Yet, some experts believe that China'southward Christian population is growing, perhaps speedily. Nigh notably, 1 of the world'southward leading specialists on organized religion in China, Purdue Academy sociologist Fenggang Yang, estimates that the Christian population in Prc grew at an average annual rate of vii% between 1950 and 2010. At this charge per unit, Yang calculates the proportion of China's population that is Christian could grow from 5% in 2010 to 67% in 2050.37
Without survey data measuring patterns of switching amidst China's main religious groups, it is not possible to formally model switching in China, as this study does for other countries.38 Withal, it is possible to acquit sensitivity tests that provide ballpark estimates of how much bear on religious change in China could, potentially, have on the global religious landscape.
While all religious groups in China could be experiencing pregnant change through switching, media reports and expert assessments generally propose that the main effects are rising numbers of Christians and declining numbers of religiously unaffiliated people. The following sensitivity tests assume, for illustrative purposes, that switching is limited to this movement between the unaffiliated and Christians.
As of 2010, Cathay had an estimated 68 million Christians and 701 meg unaffiliated people. Due primarily to differences in the age and sex limerick of these initial populations, in the main project scenario – which does not endeavour to model religious switching – Communist china's Christian population is expected to abound slightly past 2050, to 71 1000000, while the unaffiliated population is expected to refuse to 663 million.
Under that chief scenario, v.four% of China's population and 31.4% of the world's total population will exist Christian in 2050. If Mainland china's Christian population were to decline to Japanese levels (ii.4% of the country's population) in 2050, information technology would reduce the Christian share of the global population to 30.9%. On the other hand, if China's Christian population was to increment to the level projected for South Korea in 2050 (33.3% of the country'south population), it would enhance the count of Christians in China to 437 million and the share of Christians in the world'southward overall population to 35.3%.
And if anybody who is currently unaffiliated in China were to convert to Christianity by 2050, Mainland china'southward population would be 56.ii% Christian (734 million Christians), raising the Christian share of the world'southward population to 38.5% and lowering the unaffiliated share of the global population to 6.1%. Though that scenario may exist unlikely, it offers a rough sense of how much difference religious switching in China maximally could have by 2050. Extremely rapid growth of Christianity in Red china could maintain or, conceivably, even increase Christianity'southward current numerical advantage equally the world's largest religion, and information technology could significantly accelerate the projected reject by 2050 in the share of the global population that is religiously unaffiliated.
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Source: https://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/main-factors-driving-population-growth/
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